Social Justice as Real Freedom for All : A Reply to Arneson, Fleurbaey , Melnyk and Selznick by Van Parijs, Philippe
1 
 SOCIAL JUSTICE AS REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL  
Reply to Arneson, Fleurbaey, Melnyk and Selznick 
Philippe Van Parijs 
Université catholique de Louvain 
Chaire Hoover d'éthique économique et sociale 
 
Political Economy of the Good Society (PEGS) 7 (1), Winter 1997, pp. 42-48 
 
 
According to Real Freedom for All (henceforth RFA), social justice demands that 
one should introduce an unconditional basic income for every citizen, pitched at the 
highest sustainable level compatible with the protection of everyone's formal 
freedom and the satisfaction of some criterion for the adequate compensation of 
handicaps. Unsurprisingly many disagree, including — though in very different 
ways and to different extents — the four thoughtful contributors to a stimulating 
PEGS symposium.1 In this short response, I shall leave aside minor quibbles, 
misattributions or misunderstandings and concentrate on what I regard as the most 
threatening or interesting challenges.  
 
The task of political philosophy 
According to Philip Selznick (47), RFA"can do much to stimulate thought and 
clarify ideals. It is no substitute, however, for a more historical, more empirical, more 
multivalent theory of social justice". I agree: it is not. Nor does it pretend to be. RFA 
makes, for example, no claim to answering such interesting empirical questions as 
why beliefs about the nature or place of social justice vary the way they do from one 
place or time to another, or why major steps towards greater social justice turn out to 
be possible at some places and times, while proving altogether impossible at others. 
RFA's aim is more modest, though still ambitious enough. It is rather, as Selznick 
puts it, to "clarify ideals". This does not mean that it should pay no attention, for 
example, to "the risks and costs of degrading dependency" or take no account "of 
what work means for personal well-being and social integration" (ibid.). The 
intellectual endeavour in which I am engaged, along with many other political 
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philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition (including my other three critics), 
consists in trying to rigorously clarify political ideals by proposing some explicit 
general principles and critically scrutinizing their concrete institutional implications. 
Such scrutiny may reveal that, by the standards of our considered judgements, the 
principles proposed in RFA pay insufficient attention to the requirements of social 
integration or to the costs of dependency. But this would be welcome objections 
within the framework of my inquiry, rather than a challenge to the inquiry itself. 
This inquiry, according to Selznick (46-47), belongs to "a genus we may call 
axiomatic rationalism", whose methodology is typically displayed in the discussion 
of whether "distributive justice requires full compensation for, say, innate differences 
of talent". A positive answer to this question, Selznick says "is taken for granted" in 
RFA. "Yet such a view detaches social justice from the funded experience of human 
communities; and moral equality becomes a naked premise for deductive reasoning, 
abstracted from tacit understandings about self-acceptance and humility". It is not 
quite correct to say that RFA requires full compensation of talent inequalities (see 
below the Arneson-Fleurbaey objection that it undercompensates the handicapped). 
But suppose it did. This would not be by virtue of some deductive reasoning from 
the naked premises of moral equality. It would be as a result of trying to find an 
optimal fit between a consistent set of principles and one's considered judgements. 
Deductive reasoning unavoidably plays a role in the search for consistency and the 
spelling out of implications. But this can hardly be labelled "axiomatic rationalism". 
For the key premises of the deductions are not naked axioms born out of nowhere, 
but revisable principles which indeed, "like Rawls's difference principle, will never 
be given a 'final' formulation" (47) and which have no deeper justification than their 
claim to capture — admittedly in a stylized and critical way — part of the "tacit 
understandings" and "funded experience" of our human community. I can see no 
reason why a conception of social justice arrived at in this way could not stimulate 
fruitful interaction between political philosophy and the relevant parts of the social 
sciences, nor why it could not serve as a "practical guide to social policy and 
institutional design" (ibid.). Indeed, my daily experience as a philosopher 
surrounded by economists and actively involved in the public debate demonstrates 
the reverse.  
When complaining (in his title) about real-libertarianism lacking foundations, 
Melnyk suggests instead that my way of arguing does not look enough like 
"axiomatic rationalism", and that I might at least have attempted to provide my 
principles of justice with contractarian foundations, whether of a Rawlsian, 
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Narvesonian or Lomaskian variety (Melnyk, 44)2. Like Rawls , however, I view 
original-position arguments as no more than illuminating devices for sorting out 
some of our considered judgements within the framework of a more encompassing 
search for a reflective equilibrium. This is why most of my argument is unavoidably 
"negative" (ibid.), as it consists in showing how the principles I defend can be 
reconciled with persuasive judgements which seem to contradict them. When 
Melnyk dismisses formal-libertarianism as "absurd" or when he endorses as 
"sensible" my retreat from equality to maximin (ibid.), the "foundations" on which he 
stands are not fundamentally different. Nor do they need to be. 
 
The privilege of justice 
On the background of this methodology which I  broadly share with three of 
my critics, there is, however, a further assumption which, along with Melnyk and 
Fleurbaey (I believe), I am willing to make, but to which Arneson takes exception. It 
consists in "an unargued asymmetry between the status of the good and the right" 
(Arneson, 39). The state, I am assuming, must be neutral between rival conceptions 
of the good life, but not between rival conceptions of the just society. If this 
assumption rests on the claim that we always are or can be more certain about which 
society is more just than about which life is better, then it seems shaky indeed. Is it 
not obvious enough that a life spent surfing is better than a life spent watching 
surfers on TV, while being far from obvious that the highest sustainable basic income 
is more just than, say, a basic income at subsistence level? "We see through a glass 
darkly. But so far as I can tell, we see the good and the right through the same glass." 
(ibid.) If this is the case, should we not reconsider the priority commonly ascribed to 
the principles of justice? Should we not allow the search for the just to be guided by 
what we know about the good? Should the pursuit of the good not be freed from the 
constraints imposed by what we conjecture about the just? 
The "asymmetric" view which Arneson questions here is widely shared among 
political philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition. This is why I felt no need to 
justify it at any length in RFA. But its being widely shared does not mean that it does 
not need defending nor that it is easy to defend. My own reason for subscribing to it 
is not contingent on the possibly false empirical claim that there is more spontaneous 
consensus about the just than there is about the good. At the most fundamental level, 
characterizing the just and characterizing the good are not methodologically distinct, 
and the search for our reflective equilibrium does not systematically yield more 
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certainty for one than for the other. My commitment to the asymmetry rather rests 
on the confidence I have that I can, through the power of argument, move people 
over to the conception of justice I have come to hold, whereas I do not have any 
comparable confidence as regards my conception of the good life. When faced with a 
disagreement about what constitutes a fair definition and distribution of rights and 
resources, I feel there are significantly more leverages at my disposal, more shared 
intuitions which can get the argument going, than when faced with a disagreement 
about what truly matters in life or what constitutes a valuable existence. Why this 
should be so is a big question on which others, not least John Rawls, have had much 
of interest to say. But that it is so even Arneson seems to admit it. For his own 
substantive objections to the central claims of RFA do not hinge on his assessment of 
the relative value of different types of life, but rather on a conception of distributive 
justice which is significantly different from but just as "neutral" as mine in the 
relevant sense.3   
 
Undominated diversity 
One of these objections is that the conception of justice expounded in RFA 
would make us do too little for the truly needy. The first reason Arneson mentions 
for expecting this is rooted in RFA's very choice of real freedom or opportunities as 
what fundamentally matters for the sake of justice. "The abilities to choose and 
follow sensible values and fundamental life aims that could withstand rational 
critical reflection are distributed unequally across persons" (39). In other words, 
there are good and bad choosers out of given opportunities, and concentrating 
exclusively on opportunities is therefore unfair to bad choosers. "Theories of justice 
should no more make a fetish of freedom than of any other means to the good life or 
part of it" (40). This first form of Arneson's objection is easy to answer. For in 
Arneson's own characterization, people's abilities to choose "are themselves talents 
that are in the first instance bestowed by genetic endowment and early socialization" 
(ibid.). They therefore form an essential component of the real freedom, or the 
opportunities, or the "means" somehow given to people, and hence of what 
fundamentally matters to social justice as I understand it.4 
Arneson has a second, more specific reason for fearing that I may give an 
unfairly bad deal to some of the truly needy. It derives from my adoption of 
undominated diversity (borrowed, with some adjustment, from Bruce Ackerman) as 
an appropriate criterion of just transfer to people with handicaps. Undominated 
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diversity obtains if and only if for any two individuals' comprehensive endowments 
(i.e. their wealth and their talents in a broad sense), it is not the case that every 
member in society prefers one individual's comprehensive endowment over the 
other's. Along with several other critics,5 Arneson is afraid that such a criterion will 
make transfers stop too soon, leaving handicaps inadequately uncompensated. This 
risk would not materialize if preferences were homogeneous across the society. In 
this imaginary case, Arneson would not find undominated diversity too stingy. 
Indeed, he would find it too generous (at least in an unqualified version which RFA 
does not endorse), as clearly indicated by his incidental remark that a tiny benefit for 
a single worst off individual is not worth foregoing a huge windfall for many people 
who are just slightly better off (39). The risk of what Arneson would regard as 
inadequate compensation only arises when preferences are heterogeneous, when 
many conceptions of the good coexist in the same society, yielding different rankings 
among people's comprehensive bundles. 
 One part of the problem then is, as Fleurbaey (51) puts it, that "one individual 
with crazy preferences may be enough to block redistribution". The magnitude of 
this problem shrinks considerably if one admits, as I do, that "preferences do not 
closely track what ultimately matters to us about our own lives" (Arneson, 41). 
Taking actual preferences at face value is particularly inappropriate in this case, as 
"one can suspect that people are essentially unable to assess handicaps they do not 
have" (Fleurbaey, 51). Only "a reasonable set of preferences that would withstand 
rational scrutiny" (Arneson, 41) should therefore be taken into account. While 
recognizing the practical difficulty of deciding where to stop, I explicitly stated that I 
had no objection to such trimming of preferences (see sections 3.6 and 3.7 of RFA). 
Had I understood undominated diversity as a scheme in which people would 
actually be asked to express their current preferences in pair-wise comparisons of 
comprehensive endowments, I would, along with Fleurbaey, "really hope, and [be] 
very confident, that no attempt will ever be made to apply [it]" (ibid.). 
The trickiest part of the problem, however, is what we are left with after this 
trimming is done: co-existent reasonable conceptions of the good life yield different 
fully informed pair-wise rankings among comprehensive endowments. 
Undominated diversity amounts to demanding a transfer only when the ranking is 
unanimous. Could one not make the criterion less stingy by imposing a weaker 
condition on the overall profile of preferences6, for example by requiring some 
majority short of unanimity to trigger the transfers, or by appealing to "reasonable 
average preferences" (Fleurbaey, 51), or by using some independent "measure of the 
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quality of an individual's life" (Arneson, 41)? Any such move would open the 
embarrassing possibility that a transfer from A to B will be mandated in a case in 
which B is better endowed than A in terms of both A's and B's reasonable 
conceptions of the good life.7 One way of arriving at (duly trimmed) undominated 
diversity is by trying to find the most generous consistent criterion of redistribution 
to the handicapped that rules out this embarrassing possibility.  
There is, however, another criterion (as it happens, advocated by Arneson in 
earlier writings) that would seem to do the job just as well, while being likely to be 
quite a bit more generous. It consists in equalizing opportunity for welfare, or the 
highest level of preference satisfaction each person can achieve, given her 
(comprehensive) endowment and (trimmed) preferences.8 Undominated diversity 
and equal opportunity for welfare are obviously equivalent if preferences can be 
assumed to be the same for all. But even if they cannot, equal opportunity for 
welfare collapses into undominated diversity if interpersonal comparison of welfare 
are ruled out. A ban on interpersonal comparisons may be justified by epistemic 
reasons (the practical difficulty of designing a measuring rod for preference 
satisfaction) but also by deeper ethical reasons (the radical incommensurability of 
what counts as success in life). In this light, my option for the less redistributive 
criterion of undominated diversity can legitimately be described as "a theoretical cost 
of [my] rigid insistence on neutrality on the good" (Arneson, 41) by those who would 
like me to be more generous towards those they regard as less talented or 
handicapped.  In order to assess the extent to which this cost "makes the egalitarian 
credentials of [my] position highly dubious" (ibid.), it is, however, of crucial 
importance to bear in mind that in the full conception of justice I defend, the less 
talented are entitled not only to whatever transfer undominated diversity may 
mandate, but also to the highest sustainable per capita share of the external resources 
to which the more talented can get access by virtue of their talents. It is only because 
of this further component — maximum basic income — that my egalitarian concern 
for the less talented can serenely bear the cost of imposing no more than 
undominated diversity.   9  
 
Unconditional basic income 
This takes us straight to the most controversial and perhaps least well 
understood component of the book.  Arneson (38) ventures that I "may care more 
about the basic income grant policy than about the nuances of distributive justice", 
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while Fleurbaey (49) complains that "the idea of maximizing the basic income income 
is proposed first, and then it is argued that the complications of real life make at least 
an acceptable metric of real freedom". In a sense, they are both right. I do not mean 
that all I am after is an ideological justification for a preconceived policy proposal 
which I want to push forward by any available means.10 But along with many others, 
from Paine and Mill to Russell and Meade, the idea of a basic income has struck me 
from the start as beautifully accommodating both my firm libertarian and my firm 
egalitarian intuitions. And RFA is to a large an extent an attempt to elaborate a 
consistent conception of justice that spells out these intuitions and justifies a basic 
income, while not generating any implication which I would myself find 
embarrassing. 
So, contrary to what some of my formulations may have suggested, my project 
cannot be described as starting from some abstract notion of equal freedom (Melnyk, 
44) or leximin real freedom (Fleurbaey, 51) and then logically deriving the 
proposition that an unconditional basic income should be maximized. In the 
prologue to one of the chapters (RFA, 32), I emphasized "that 'real-freedom-for-all' is 
in a way a misnomer — though such a good one that I have decided to keep it. It is 
not the size or the extent of their real freedom that real-freedom-for-all requires just 
institutions to maximize for the worst off. It is rather the endowment of means or 
resources that form the substratum of this real freedom." If all we had to guide us 
were a concern with equalizing (or maximinning or whatever) the extent of real 
freedom, then Fleurbaey (49) would be right that (generally incommensurable) full 
budget sets (or sets of consumption and leisure possibilities) are what we should 
concentrate on. But only the  arbitrary selection of the "full-leisure hyperplane of the 
consumption space" (i.e. the part of the budget set that is accessible to people if they 
do no work at all), it would seem, will lead to maximum basic income as the optimal 
solution.  
Instead, my intuitive starting point is that justice requires people to be 
equipped for life, if not with equal, at least with maximin endowments.11 What this 
means as far internal resources are concerned is specified by undominated diversity. 
What this means as far as external resources are concerned is that the value of the 
least valuable endowment should be maximized.  And the value of the external-
resource component of someone's endowment is defined by its opportunity cost, by 
how much other people care about not being able to use it themselves. In a market 
economy, this opportunity cost is helpfully approximated by competitive prices. 
Now, even assuming that undominated diversity is satisfied, this approach does not 
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justify maximizing the basic income under all imaginable circumstances. For example, 
if all people were propertyless and identically talented and if the labour market 
worked not just in a perfectly competitive way but in a perfectly Walrasian way — 
i.e. without any competitive forces preventing the market from clearing —, then real-
freedom-for-all would recommend a basic income of zero even if it were possible to 
sustainably finance a significant basic income out of the taxation of labour income. 
This is exactly the point of departure of my "Crazy-Lazy challenge" (RFA, section 
4.1).  
But our real world is, for deep-rooted reasons, crucially different. In particular, 
labour income contains a major "gift" or "rent" element because most jobs are scarce 
relative to the number of people who would like to hold them (even if they could 
not), whether because they require skills that not everyone has the ability to acquire, 
or because market forces or institutional constraints keep wages above the market-
clearing level. Under such circumstances, maximizing the unconditional basic 
income through predictable taxation is the fair thing to do. But "how can (one) 
simultaneously insist on neutrality with respect to conceptions of the good life, and 
advocate distortionary taxes and transfers that penalize work and favour leisure"? 
(Fleurbaey, 49). Fundamentally, because of the crucial asymmetry between 
involuntary unemployment an involuntary employment. The constraint of self-
ownership — which implies, in particular, that the labour market operates with 
formally free workers rather than slaves — bans the latter, but not the former. It is 
the crucial fact that workers are not owned by their employers, and can therefore 
leave their jobs, which guarantees (with some qualifications specified in RFA) that 
every worker's job is of non-negative value and hence cannot depress her 
endowment below the basic income she receives along with everyone else. This is the 
fundamental reason why an unconditional basic income, which can be said to 
penalize work and favour leisure, can nonetheless pass the test of neutrality whereas 
employment subsidies, for example, could not. However "unlikely", it is the case, 
therefore, that "simply by taking account of the complexity of real life the objective 
should become the maximization of basic income" (Fleurbaey 49). In the purified 
world of the simplest economic models, gifts can be assumed away entirely. In the 
real world, they are ubiquitous. It is in this world that a maximum basic income is 
justified, to make sure that the person who receives least receives more than the 
person who receives least under any other feasible arrangement, given an impartial 
metric of what counts as "more" or "least". 
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Does this not lead, nonetheless, to "transfers of unconditional income 
supplements to an heterogeneous class of individuals who have above average real 
freedom prior to this transfer and should be net givers not takers in a just tax and 
transfer scheme" (Arneson, 42)? Am I not advocating "a morally topsy-turvy world 
in which distributive justice transfers would incorrectly require some of the 
disadvantaged to subsidize the incomes of some of the advantaged" (ibid.)? I would 
be, if basic income maximization did not operate under the constraint of 
undominated diversity. Lazy and talented A could then be indulging in a surfing life 
made possible, via unconditional transfers, by hard-working and untalented B. But 
once undominated diversity is satisfied, there are, by definition, reasonable 
conceptions of the good life around in terms of which it is worker W who is more 
"talented", more "advantaged" than surfer S, even though S has, say, a higher earning 
potential than W (while being inferior to W in other respects) and is therefore 
deemed by Arneson more advantaged than W. What I am advocating is impartiality 
among these conflicting conceptions of the good life — which makes Arneson's 
description of the situation in terms of advantaged versus disadvantaged 
intrinsically problematic — while refusing the highly inegalitarian consequences of 
requiring no more than undominated diversity. And this I can consistently do 
through demanding a maximin distribution of the value of external endowments. 
For since those with greater earning power are able to get hold of more valuable 
jobs, basic income maximization will generally redistribute away from them.  
Let me now push Arneson's objection a bit further. Under my conception, it 
may happen that a low-earning potential high-earner S derives net transfers from a 
higher-earning person W with a lower earning potential. I am not bothered with this 
as such, as earning power is only one of many dimensions in people's endowments, 
which should not receive an undue privilege, and if undominated diversity is met W 
is advantaged relative to S along other dimensions. The problem is that S's being less 
keen to work may be due to his having access to other unequally distributed gifts, 
whose value is not appropriately taken into account in the redistributive scheme 
(from easy access to the beach to a tight network of friends or a fabulous partner). 
The unfairness would then be due, not to S not pulling his weight, but to his having 
access to "external resources" which are not up for redistribution in the same way as 
those to which W is confined. This is a genuine problem, but it merges into the 
general issue of pragmatic imperfection: just as standard material gifts can only be 
roughly identified and valued (what we receive from our parents is not just the 
estate left at their death, but also, for example, a more or less comfortable living 
environment throughout our childhood), just as there is quite a bit of fuzziness about 
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what should be added to a job's pecuniary reward (business lunches, thick carpets, 
coffee breaks ?) and how they should be assessed, similarly I recognize that there is 
bound to be no sharp line delineating how far to extend the set of assets whose value 
should be assessed and redistributed: if jobs are included, why not marriages? (see 
RFA, section 4.8) Although I would welcome any well argued attempt to sharpen the 
line, I do not find this fuzziness deeply disturbing. As in the case of undominated 
diversity, the general outline is sufficiently specific to provide firm guidance, jointly 
with the best available empirical knowledge, on many issues of public policy. 
 
Capitalism vs socialism 
Suppose, then, that we can stick to constrained basic income maximization as a 
criterion of assessment, should one opt for some variety of socialism or some variety 
of capitalism? Melnyk (44-45) praises my appreciation of "the extraordinary wealth-
creating capacity of capitalism", but blames me for failing even to mention what he 
sees as the knock-dowm blow against socialism, Mises' and Hayek's economic 
calculation argument. I have always understood the latter as one of several ways of 
expressing capitalism's significant informational advantages in terms of both (static) 
allocation and (dynamic) innovation, which I fully recognize (RFA, sections 6.4 and 
6.6). What I discuss in the book (see RFA, 220)  as the socialists' best response to this 
argument — managers' autonomy — coincides with the one mentioned by Melnyk 
(44) and I entirely agree with his rejoinder that "decentralized economic decision-
making is the key, whatever we care to call it" (ibid.). So, although I am quite willing 
to grant that many of the pro-capitalist (or indeed pro-socialist) arguments I consider 
could have been phrased in more appealing or illuminating ways, I do not think the 
lack of an explicit discussion of the calculation argument will be missed by anyone 
with no taste for overkill. 
Fleurbaey (48) regrets, on the contrary, that I did not devote enough space to 
recent debates on market socialism. Although I regularly return to the possible 
advantages of an economy made up of labour-owned firms, which is one 
interpretation of market socialism, I did not include, for example, a discussion of the 
Bardhan-Roemer model of an economy combining public ownership and a market-
like mechanism for efficient capital allocation, which is another plausible 
interpretation of market socialism. Such a model may well be most relevant to the 
discussion of possible futures for China. But I suspect that Fleurbaey will agree that  
in the West the transitional costs alone would be so great as to overshadow any 
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advantage the model might conceivably have, in terms of real-freedom-for-all, 
because of the firmer hold over the means of production it permits (see RFA, section 
6.7). 
According to Fleurbaey (48), in any case, the question of socialism versus 
capitalism "is quite obsolete after the fall of the Berlin Wall". Fine with me. Indeed, 
one of the most central aims of RFA is to shift the focus of discussion "away from the 
traditional question with which this book started - the choice between capitalism and 
socialism - towards other dimensions along which socio-economic regimes may 
vary. Key issues for the future are rather whether, when and how one should 
introduce an unconditional basic income, attribute redistributive powers to 
supranational authorities, or constrain the organization of social life so as to nurture 
feelings of solidarity" (RFA, 232-33). What I tried to do in the book is to elaborate and 
defend a normative vision that would put these issues into perspective and guide the 
careful thinking and resolute action they urgently call for. This vision remains loyal 
to the emancipatory project that has been driving many advocates of socialism over 
the last 150 years. But it radically reshapes this project so as to make it relevant to the 
technologically sophisticated, ecologically threatened, economically globalized, 
geographically mobile, culturally fragmented world into which we are moving.  
The final years of this millennium are not a time for complacency nor for 
despair. Threats are everywhere, but disasters can be averted and turned to the 
good. For this to happen, however,countless conditions need to be met. One of them 
is the further development, across the borders of disciplines and nations and through 
relentless critical discussion, of boldly prospective thinking that combines a lucid 
analysis of the challenges ahead and an explicit conception of what would make a 
society a good society, of what would make our world a better world.  So 
understood, the "political economy of the good society" is the urgent business to 
which RFA, its four critics and this response have all tried to contribute. 
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handicap, in a society in which other reasonable and fully informed people find B 
better endowed than A. This is fundamentally why Fleurbaey's interesting and 
prima facie attractive condition of full compensation is not compelling in my view. 
8 Another apparently quite different way of clarifying the choice for 
undominated diversity over equal opportunity for welfare is by stating that the 
former, unlike the latter, holds people responsible for the consequences on their 
welfare of having the (reasonable) preferences they have rather than anyone else's in 
the relevant community. According to one interpretation, this amounts to assuming 
that people actually chose their preferences from the set of (reasonable) preference 
schedules available in the community, or that they could switch over at no cost to 
any of these. This corresponds to the "wildly implausible" supposition ascribed to me 
by Arneson "that anybody can choose any preferences at will" (40). Equalizing 
opportunity for welfare, if one assumes people to be "responsible" in this sense, 
requires preference not to be taken as given, but to be optimally chosen by each so as 
to maximize achievable preference satisfaction with her given internal endowments. 
Applying the criterion then consists in first combining each person's internal 
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endowment with her most favourable preference schedule and then allocating 
(positive and negative) external resources so as to equalize maximum achievable 
welfare. Nothing guarantees a priori that equal opportunity for welfare, under this 
interpretation, will involve less redistribution than with given preferences (the less 
talented will no doubt have access to greater welfare for any given level external 
resources, but so will the more talented), nor therefore that it will move closer to 
undominated diversity.  Thus, combining equal potential welfare with even full 
responsibility for one's preferences seems far from yielding undominated diversity. 
However, as RFA (80-82) makes insufficiently clear and Fleurbaey (50) rightly 
emphasizes, there is a second and quite distinct interpretation of what justifies 
holding people responsible for the welfare consequences of their preferences: not the 
assumption that they could change their preferences at will within the set of 
reasonable preferences, but the assumption that they identify with them. Some 
people attach great importance to artistic or political achievement, others to saving 
money for a pilgrimage to Mecca, others again to taking great care of their elderly 
parents. Given the endowments they happen to have, switching over to the 
reasonable conception of the good life held by someone else in the society may 
greatly improve their prospects for preference satisfaction. But whether or not they 
could do so, they would not, because their conception of the good is part of what 
they are. But if it is the case that they would not, then they should be held 
responsible for the welfare consequences of subscribing to their own particular 
conception. Hence, they should not be compensated for any welfare deficit that may 
result, i.e. for the cost of being who they are and want to be, rather than some other 
reasonable person. It does not follow, however, that they should never be 
compensated, however miserable their endowment. For if according to all reasonable 
preference schedules around, one person's endowment is worse than someone else's, 
a transfer from the latter to the former would not contradict the idea that people 
should be held responsible for the welfare consequences of their identity, i.e. of the 
particular selection among reasonable conceptions of the good life which is 
constitutive of their selves. Hence, under this second interpretation of responsibility 
(for not holding any of the other reasonable preference schedules), the concern with 
equalizing opportunity for welfare naturally weakens into requiring transfers only in 
those cases in which all reasonable conceptions around yield the same verdict. 
Equality of potential welfare degenerates into undominated diversity. (Although the 
formulation is quite different, the intuition is fundamentally the same as in the 
ethically motivated banning of interpersonal welfare comparisons.) 
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 9 Perhaps it should also lead me to demanding no less than undominated 
diversity. Sustainable basic income maximization, in my proposal, operates under 
two constraints: undominated diversity and formal freedom — or a well-enforced 
system of property rights that incorporates self-ownership for all —, with the latter 
being given priority over the former. In the path leading up to undominated 
diversity in RFA, I make much of Lovely's plight, who may be forced to work all day 
in a peep show if alternative prima facie plausible principles of just compensation 
were used. Undominated diversity, I claim, "avoids the slavery of the talented 
because talented individuals will not be forced to work up to the point where they 
envy less talented individuals" (Fleurbaey, 49). However, Fleurbaey notes, "the 
criterion is very weak and allows a substantial degree of slavery of the talented" 
(ibid.). This is true, but my proposal is basic income maximization subject to 
undominated diversity, not simply undominated diversity, and this will block a 
redistribution to the less talented that would make the talented envious. But it does 
not necessarily block slavery of the talented in the weaker sense of the talented being 
subjected to a lump sum tax that exceeds their external endowment, an imposition 
which would conflict with self-ownership as understood in RFA. To prevent such 
slavery of the talented, I give priority to the constraint of formal freedom to the 
constraint of undominated diversity. But perhaps I should not. In case everyone 
agrees that B's endowment is clearly worse than A's, I may well consider, in 
reflective equilibrium, that burdening the better endowed A with a lump sum tax 
that would make a significant difference to B and still leave A at least as well off as B 
in her own terms, would be worth a violation of self-ownership. 
10 On the other hand, I may welcome unconventional strategic alliances if they 
help us forward in what I see as the right direction. Thus, I won't refuse the 
somewhat unexpected support from Andrew Melnyk's "mild libertarianism": "a free 
society requires, in addition to a private property-rights system and self-ownership 
for all, that each person be guaranteed an unconditional income sufficient to serve 
him or her from the fate of the proletarians [...], perhaps an unconditional income 
sufficient to obviate the need to work" (Melnyk 44). Given current trends in the U.S. 
and elsewhere, this indicates that Melnyk and I have a large (and tough) common 
agenda. 
11 In his useful attempt to reconstruct my argument, Melnyk (44-45) attributes 
to me a chain of reasoning from justice to freedom, then to equal freedom, then to 
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equal shares of the world, then to maximin share of the world and finally to 
maximum basic income. The fatally weak link is between equal freedom and equal 
shares: "The fallacy here is the assumption that since freedom requires owning some 
share of the world, equal freedom requires owning equal shares of the world". But 
the imperative to equalize (or maximin) the value of the shares of the world we are 
endowed with is not arrived it by unpacking an abstract notion of freedom given in 
advance, but by spelling out a conception of justice that would fit not only my own 
intuitions but also those of the audience the book is primarily address to: people who 
believe — like Melnyk — that "freedom is of paramount importance", but also — 
unlike Melnyk ? — that "our capitalist societies are replete with unacceptable 
inequalities" (RFA, 1). 
